I
N A MEDICAL malpractice action, scientific testimony from expert witnesses, usually a physician who is a specialist in the relevant field, is often critical to a successful outcome, whether for the negligently injured patient or the wrongly accused doctor. For many years, the testimony of an expert witness offering such evidence would be admitted at trial if the opinion offered was based on "a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery" that was "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." 1 That standard changed in 1993 with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 2 In this article we provide an introduction to the Daubert standard, with particular emphasis on the concept of "relative risk" that courts are using with increasing frequency to determine issues of causation in medical malpractice cases. 3 Interpreting Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 4 which provides that in cases where the evidence to be provided requires "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge," the testimony must be based on "sufficient facts or data," and it must be "the product of reliable principles and methods" applied reliably to the facts of the case, the Daubert court implemented a flexible inquiry, requiring trial judges to act as gatekeepers who screen expert testimony to ensure that it is both reliable and relevant before it is presented to a jury. Knowing what factors trial judges will consider in determining admissibility will greatly aid expert witnesses in preparing their opinions and in advising lawyers and their clients when a particular opinion sought is not scientifically sound. "[E]ven a qualified expert is capable of rendering scientifically unreliable testimony." 5 The first prong of a Daubert analysis is whether the testimony is scientifically reliable. The Daubert court noted that "[t]he subject of an expert's testimony must be 'scientific . . . knowledge.' The adjective 'scientific' implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science. Similarly, the word 'knowledge' connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation." 6 To be reliable, the court held that the opinion or theory must be "derived by the scientific method [and] . . . supported by appropriate validation-i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known." 7 The second prong, relevancy, is also called "fit." 8 This consideration requires the evidence to be "sufficiently tied to the facts of the case to 'make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.' " 9 The trial court has the obligation to ensure that the proposed expert testimony is "relevant to the task at hand" and logically advances a material aspect of the proposing party's case. 10 "[T]he standard for fit is higher than bare relevance." 11 Under Daubert, a court must first make a "preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." 12 The Daubert court identified the following factors that, although not mandated or exclusive, might be helpful to a court's inquiry:
1. whether the scientific knowledge either can be or has been tested;
2. whether the "theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication";
3. whether the technique has a "known or potential rate of error"; and 4. whether there is "general acceptance" of the scientific technique. 13 The Daubert court emphasized that the focus of a Rule 702 inquiry "must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate." 14 Physicians should be cautious to avoid taking the stance that their opinions should be accepted simply because they are "experts" in their fields. 15 Although a Daubert inquiry is flexible, courts applying it are required to exclude expert testimony if it is connected to the underlying facts by nothing more than the ipse dixit of the expert. 16 "A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." 17 For example, in one case the United States Supreme Court affirmed the district court's exclusion of expert testimony "because it was within the District Court's discretion to conclude that the studies on which the experts relied were not sufficient, whether individually or in combination, to support their conclusions that [the plaintiff 's] exposure to [polychlorinated biphenyls] contributed to his cancer." 18 In some recent medical malpractice cases, courts have used the concept of "relative risk," which has an extensive history in toxic tort and product liability cases, when performing a Daubert analysis of the admissibility of causation evidence. Courts have repeatedly held that when epidemiologic studies establish that a relative risk factor is greater than 2.0, a jury can reliably conclude that the exposure caused the injury under the preponderance of the evidence standard. 19 As explained by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, "the threshold for concluding that an agent more likely than not caused a disease is 2.0. A relative risk of 1.0 means that the agent has no causative effect on incidence. A relative risk of 2.0 thus implies a 50% likelihood that the agent caused the disease. Risks greater than 2.0 permit an inference that the plaintiff's disease was more likely than not caused by the agent." 20 On the other hand, if the relative risk is 2.0 or less, then the background risk is at least as likely to have caused the injury as the alleged negligence, and legal causation cannot be found (eg, see ref 21) .
A recent example of the application of relative risk in a medical malpractice context is Theofanis v. Sarrafi, 22 where the plaintiff had suffered a stroke caused by a blood clot. The defendant physician had been notified of the results of an electrocardiogram performed on the plaintiff that showed the presence of the blood clot but failed to inform the plaintiff of the test results or put her on medication in the 8 days between the test and the stroke. 23 After the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant liable but awarding no damages, the plaintiff sought a new trial on the basis of the inconsistency of the verdict. 24 When the trial court refused and entered judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff appealed.
The appellate court reversed and ordered a new trial. It noted:
"Where a defendant's acts or omissions have increased the risk of a harm that later occurs, courts look to the relative risk-the ratio of the risk with the negligent act to the risk without negligence-to decide whether the negligent acts or omissions constitute a cause in fact of the harm.. [W] here the risk with the negligent act is at least twice as great as the risk in the absence of negligence, the evidence supports a finding that, more likely than not, the negligence in fact caused the harm." 25 Because the plaintiff's experts had testified to a relative risk of between 2.0 and 3.0, the court found that there was "ample evidence" that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the harm, and it granted a new trial. 26 Where the relative risk is not greater than 2.0 or where the relative risk is unknown, Daubert and its progeny can provide support for defendant health care providers to move to exclude expert testimony on the issue of causation. For example, in neonatal cases involving treatment for hyperbilirubinemia, experts often opine "with reasonable medical certainty" that performing additional phototherapy or an exchange transfusion at an arbitrary level of total serum bilirubin would probably have prevented a neonate from developing kernicterus (bilirubin-induced encephalopathy). A Daubert motion might well succeed in barring such testimony, because there is a paucity of medical literature to establish the relative risks of bilirubin-induced encephalopathy for neonates exposed to various levels or doses of bilirubin. We believe that it is more often in the application to specific issues such as causation, rather than in attempts to bar expert witnesses from testifying altogether, that Daubert can help counsel for health care providers persuade judges to exclude bad science and medicine from the courtroom.
